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Part I 
Linguistic Diversity: Origins and Measurement 
1 
Linguistic Theory, Linguistic Diversity and 
Whorfian Economics 
Nigel Fabb 
University of Strathclyde 
Abstract 
Languages vary greatly in their words, sounds and sentence structures. Linguistic theory has 
shown that many aspects of variation are superficial and may not reflect underlying formal 
similarities between languages, which are relevant to how humans learn and process 
language. In this chapter, I show both how languages can vary and how the surface variations 
can be manifestations of underlying similarities. Economists have sometimes adopted a 
ÔWhorfianÕ view that differences in languages can cause differences in how their speakers 
think and behave. Psychological experiments have shown both support for this hypothesis 
and evidence against it. Specific arguments that language causes thought, which have been 
made in recent economics papers, are examined in the light of what linguistics tells us about 
superficial and underlying variation. 
1.1 Introduction 
I begin this chapter by illustrating what theoretical linguists do and why generative linguistics 
in particular has argued that linguistic data is more abstract and more complex than at first 
appears. I then illustrate language diversity by comparing aspects of two languages, English 
and MaÕdi, an East African language. Sections 1.2 and 1.3 focus on specific aspects of 
linguistic data, which are chosen to illustrate general points about linguistic theory and 
linguistic diversity. In Section 1.4, I briefly note several different theories of linguistic 
diversity which explore why languages vary and whether variation is limited by internal 
(psychological) or external (cultural) factors. In Section 1.5, I examine the ÔWhorfianÕ 
hypothesis that linguistic form has a causal relation with thought and behaviour, summarize 
some of the relevant psycholinguistic work and then examine some articles by economists 
which claim causal relations between linguistic and social variation. Based in part on what I 
have said about linguistic theory and linguistic diversity, and in particular the abstractness of 
linguistic data, I will argue that the economistsÕ claims cannot be sustained.  In the final part 
of the paper I discuss some ways in which stylistic variation within a language might affect 
thought. 
1.2 Abstract linguistic form, and the rules and 
conditions which govern it 
Linguistic theory is an attempt to understand the regularities and patterns which can be found 
in language. The fundamental discovery of modern linguistic theory is that a word or 
sentence can have a complex and multi-layered abstract structure; our knowledge of language 
is knowledge of that abstract linguistic form. These discoveries about language usually take 
as a starting point Noam ChomskyÕs (1957) Syntactic Structures, and in the first part of this 
section I outline some of the ideas presented in that book. I then illustrate the evidence for 
abstract linguistic form with a number of examples, because linguistics is always a matter of 
how specific problems are discovered and solved, and how these solutions fit into a larger 
theory of language. 
1.2.1 ChomskyÕs Syntactic Structures 
Modern linguistic theory begins with the publication of Noam ChomskyÕs 1957 book 
Syntactic Structures which was consolidated in his 1965 Aspects of the Theory of Syntax; in 
this section, I summarize some of the aspects of the early Ôgenerative grammarÕ or 
Ôgenerative linguisticsÕ initiated by these books. Though no one still pursues this particular 
theoretical model, many of its findings remain true of theoretical linguistics. Chomsky begins 
by arguing for a distinction between two types of sentence: grammatical and ungrammatical. 
Ungrammatical sentences are combinations of words which are not accepted as sentences by 
native speakers, with the proviso that this is not a judgement based on meaning or social 
acceptability: that is, that speakers can make judgements of grammaticality based just on the 
form of a sentence. Chomsky proposes that a grammar of a language should be a device 
which generates all and only the grammatical sentences for that language. This type of 
grammar is identified with a psychological capacity, the human knowledge of language. The 
grammar of each language is a variation on principles of a Ôuniversal grammarÕ which is 
innate and shared by all humans; the universal grammar offers ÔswitchesÕ which are turned on 
in some specific combination to produce the grammar of a specific language. 
ChomskyÕs goal is to establish what kind of grammar will generate the grammatical 
sentences of English (hence Ôgenerative grammarÕ). He notes that English comprises an 
infinite number of different grammatical sentences which must be generated by a finite 
device; this is possible because the grammar allows recursion, where for example a sentence 
can contain a sentence repeatedly, without limit. A sentence is a sequence of words, but there 
is evidence that these words are grouped into constituents which are subject to 
generalizations. Thus the grammar does not just generate the sequence of words which makes 
up the sentence, but generates a structured sequence, organized into hierarchically arranged 
constituents (see Rizzi, 2013 for detailed discussion). For example, the sequence of words in 
Figures 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 are given a structure by the grammar (in the title of each figure), and 
shown schematically as a tree structure. As can be seen, the structures differ in whether they 
allow the pronoun and John to refer to the same person (note that the structures are simplified 
and schematic, and not a full linguistic structure for the sentences). 
Note that his in Figure 1.1 can be interpreted as referring to John (but can also be 
interpreted as referring to someone else), while in Figure 1.2 he cannot be interpreted as John. 
This is not just a matter of which pronoun is used, because in Figure 1.3, he can be 
interpreted as John. This difference cannot be derived from the sequences directly, either 
from the sequences of words or from the number of words between the pronoun and the 
name. Instead, the difference is in how they are hierarchically related in the constituent 
structure as shown in the three figures. The explanation is based on a discovery made by 
theoretical linguists about the hierarchical relations between items in a tree, as I now explain. 
A node in a tree dominates other nodes (i.e. all the nodes underneath it). The nodes 
immediately underneath a node (i.e. with no intervening nodes) are Ôimmediately dominatedÕ 
by the node. So for example the topmost S dominates all the nodes in the tree, but 
immediately dominates only a noun phrase (NP) and a verb phrase (VP) in Figures 1.1 and 
1.2 and an S and a VP in Figure 1.3. The discovery about language is that there is a special 
kind of relation, called a Ôc-commandÕ, based on the relations of dominance (the nodes under 
a node) and immediate dominance (the nodes immediately under a node). Given a node X 
and a node Y which immediately dominates X, X c-commands all the nodes dominated by Y. 
Thus for example in Figure 1.4, B c-commands B, C, D and E, while E c-commands only D 
and E (the definition as given here means that a node always c-commands itself). 
In Figure 1.1, the NP his does not c-command the NP John. But in Figure 1.2, the NP 
he does c-command the NP him. This is why co-reference is possible in one case but not the 
other. The rule for English (and most if not all other languages) is as follows: 
A name cannot be c-commanded by a noun phrase (NP) which refers to it. 
This rule is what prevents the pronoun in Figure 1.2 referring to the name: the pronoun c-
commands the name because its NP is immediately dominated by the node S which 
dominates the name, and c-command prevents co-reference. In Figures 1.1 and 1.3, the NP 
which is the pronoun is buried deeper in the tree and so does not c-command the name; hence 
co-reference is possible. (At this point, I note again that this is a simplified account: the 
relevant structural relation is more complex than just Ôc-commandÕ, here and elsewhere in the 
chapter, and has been subject to theoretical revision.) This example demonstrates two 
fundamental principles of linguistic theory, agreed by almost all linguists: that there is 
abstract form (in this case, the abstract constituent structure which holds of the words), and 
that linguistic principles refer to the abstract constituent structure. 
Chomsky wants linguistic theory to formulate a grammar of a language which can 
explain aspects of the language, such as the co-reference possibilities described above. 
Another thing to explain is the ambiguity of the sequence of words visiting relatives can be 
annoying. This is ambiguous because there are two different constituent structures for the 
same sequence, one of which means that relatives are visiting (the subject is an NP referring 
to the relatives and can be restated as relatives who visit) and the other which means that 
relatives are being visited (the subject is a kind of clause referring to the visiting and can be 
restated as to visit relatives). To explain this fact demands that we accept some degree of 
abstractness, in the form of different constituent structures, and that the constituent structures 
can play a role in determining the meaning of the sequence of words. 
A fundamental part of the Syntactic Structures theory is Ôtransformational rulesÕ 
which relate different structured sequences to one another; because of the importance of these 
rules in this version of the theory it was called Ôtransformational generative grammarÕ. Thus 
the sequence the man hit the ball has the same truth conditions as the ball was hit by the man, 
and this can be achieved by a mechanism in the grammar (a transformational rule) which 
takes a structure and rearranges it: the phrase before and the phrase after the verb are changed 
in their locations in the constituent structure. Note that this rule affects multi-word 
constituents and not individual words, thus showing that knowledge of a sentence is 
knowledge not just of the sequence of words (audible on the surface) but knowledge of the 
structural relations between words. We have seen that there is an abstract level at which a 
constituent structure holds a string of words. Transformational rules show that there must be 
more than one such level, such that a final string of words can be derived from distinct 
constituent structures at different levels, related by transformational rules. Chomsky 
concludes: Ôto understand a sentence it is necessary (though of course not sufficient) to 
reconstruct its representation on each levelÕ. There are multiple abstract representations on 
different abstract levels which underlie the surface sentence, and these abstract 
representations are claimed to be psychologically real. This has significant consequences for 
our understanding of what language and Ôknowledge of languageÕ are, with problematic 
consequences for Whorfian theories under which linguistic forms are caused by or cause 
extra-linguistic thought and behaviour. 
Distinct ÔlevelsÕ are hypothesized as domains within which certain types of 
representation exist, and rules map representations from one level to another: each sentence 
has a representation on all of these levels. One model of levels of representation, the 
Ôgovernment and binding theoryÕ model (Chomsky, 1981), is shown in Figure 1.5. 
In this model, phrase structure rules build constituent structures at D-structure, and 
transformational rules produce derived constituent structures at S-structure. The constituent 
structures at S-structure are then subject to rules which produce representations of sentences, 
which at the level of phonetic form constitute speakable sentences; separately, the constituent 
structures at S-Structure are subject to rules which form representations of sentences at the 
level of logical form which can be interpreted as meaningful (e.g. using the language and 
form of predicate logic). As we will see shortly, two languages can have the same rule 
operating at different levels, leading to different surface forms (but with an underlying 
similarity). Much current generative linguistics follows the Ôminimalist programÕ (Chomsky, 
1995). It is a tenet of this approach that ÔintermediateÕ levels of syntactic representation are 
dispensed with, but the distinction remains between how a sentence is represented for 
interpretation (its logical form) and how a sentence is represented for pronunciation (its 
phonetic form). 
In the remainder of this section, I summarize three ÔclassicÕ examples (widely known 
and taught in introductory linguistics classes) of how generative linguistics has dealt with 
patterns and regularities in language. Generative linguistic theory stands or falls by its 
capacity to solve specific problems presented by a language and to fit the solutions into a 
model which can explain similar problems in any language. 
1.2.2 Vowel shift in English 
I begin by considering a problem presented by the sound patterns of English, which comes 
under the type of linguistics called ÔphonologyÕ. The English words profane and profanity are 
related: profanity is a noun produced by adding the suffix -ity to the adjective profane. 
However, when we inspect the sounds of the words we see that the second vowel in each is a 
different spoken vowel (the vowel spelled with an ÔaÕ). This difference is called Ôvowel shiftÕ 
because one vowel has shifted into another (or more specifically, as we will see, an abstract 
underlying vowel has differently shifted into the two different surface forms). In all 
languages, distinct vowels can be differentiated by vowel ÔheightÕ (roughly, how high in the 
mouth the topmost part of the tongue is when the vowel is produced), and English has high, 
mid- and low vowels. Profane has a long mid-vowel (more accurately a diphthong) 
phonetically represented as [ēy], and the phonetic representation of the word is [profēyn]. 
However, when the suffix is added, the word has a short low vowel [¾] as in [prof¾nõty]. 
This alternation is typical of the whole of the English vocabulary, where two versions of the 
same word alternate a long vowel at one height with a short vowel at a different height: the 
alternations are predictable and found throughout the vocabulary of English. We see it also in 
the changing vowels of divine and divinity (a contrast between low diphthong and high short 
vowel), and serene and serenity (a contrast between high diphthong and mid-short vowel). 
And it shows up also in the irregular verb forms, for example in the long high vowel of meet 
as opposed to the short mid-vowel of the past form met. Here we have a standard kind of 
problem for linguistic theory, similar to problems described in the previous section: two 
linguistic items are the same in one way and different in another, in a pattern which is 
characteristic of the language as a whole. 
The solution to this problem is at the core of The Sound Pattern of English, the 1968 
book by Noam Chomsky and Morris Halle (Chomsky and Halle 1968) which has the 
foundational role for phonology analogous to Syntactic Structures for syntax. They propose a 
universal theory (holding for all languages) of how sounds are organized in a language. In 
this theory, all words have an underlying form (the form in which they are stored in the 
mental lexicon), and the underlying form is subject to a fixed sequence of rules specified by 
the language, some of which leave the word unaffected and some of which change it, so that 
the surface form of the word can be different from the underlying form. For profane and 
profanity, they argue that the underlying form of the word is [profǣn], a form which is then 
changed in different ways, depending on whether the suffix is added, to produce the two 
surface forms [profēyn] and [prof¾n+õty]. Note that the underlying vowel is different from 
both of the surface vowels (either in quality or in length). In Table 1.1, I show a simplified 
version of the sequence (omitting in this example other intervening rules which are part of 
English), which takes the word from its underlying form to its surface form. 
The difference between dialects of English can sometimes be traced to a difference in 
whether or not the vowel shift rule applies; thus in the dialect of the south of England the 
word house has a low long diphthong [hāws] while the equivalent word in some Scottish 
dialects has a high long vowel [hūs] (hence the dialect spelling ÔhooseÕ). Both dialects may 
have the same underlying form with a high back vowel [hūs] but the vowel shift rule changes 
the vowel only in the English dialect, and not in the Scottish dialect. The long vowels of 
southern standard English changed in quality over the early modern period, so that there was 
a historical process of vowel shift; this historical process operated differently in different 
dialects, leading to differences between dialects. (This is how variation often emerges, 
starting by splitting dialects over time, ending with the dialects being identified as distinct 
languages.) Chomsky and Halle argue that the historical change can be understood as the 
introduction of the rule of vowel shift into the phonology of English. The historical change in 
long vowels (but not the related short vowels) partly explains why English spelling does not 
match surface sounds in a clear way: the use of the same written vowel ÔaÕ in the spelling of 
profane and profanity reflects an earlier pronunciation of these words before the vowel shift 
rule was added, at a time when the two vowels were closer. The approach to phonology taken 
by Chomsky and Halle has been largely replaced by a different type of phonological theory 
called optimality theory. Optimality theory shows some theoretical continuity: there is an 
underlying form (the input) and a surface form (the output) and the relation between them is 
controlled by a set of ranked constraints (rather than rules); constraints are always violated, 
and the optimal matching of output to input involves the least-worst violation of constraints. 
What vowel shift shows is that the sounds of words in their underlying forms (as stored in the 
mental lexicon, before the operation of phonological rules) is not the same as the sounds of 
words as they are pronounced: a description of the surface sounds of the language does not 
represent every aspect of a speakerÕs knowledge of the language, which is multi-layered. 
1.2.3 Verb second in German 
In this and the next section, I consider problems presented by sentence structures and their 
interpretation, which comes under the study of ÔsyntaxÕ. In German, a finite verb is in second 
position in a main clause. Thus the finite verb kommt (ÔcomesÕ) can be preceded by one 
constituent (which can consist of one or more words). The constituent can be one of a number 
of different types of syntactic entity, including as the subject (1) or an adverb (2) or indeed a 
whole subordinate clause as in (4). The verb-second constraint is that in a main clause the 
finite verb must be in second position, as the asterisk next to (3) indicates in a sentence where 
the verb is final: an asterisk indicates that a sentence is ungrammatical. The finite verb might 
be a main verb as in (1)Ð(2) or an auxiliary verb as in (4). 
(1) Er kommt morgen. 
he comes tomorrow 
(2) Morgen kommt er. 
tomorrow comes he 
(3) * Er morgen kommt. 
he tomorrow comes 
(4) Dass er gestern gekommen ist habe ich gesagt. 
[That he yesterday come is] have I said 
In contrast, in subordinate clauses, the finite verb Ð here komme (conjunctive ÔcomesÕ) Ð  
usually comes at the end, as (5) shows; the verb can no longer follow the subject as (6) 
shows. 
(5) Er sagte, dass er morgen komme.͒ 
He said, that he tomorrow comes. 
(6) * Er sagte, dass er komme morgen.͒ 
He said, that he comes tomorrow. 
The location of a verb relative to its subject and object, and relative to other aspects of a 
sentence, is one of the most widely noted syntactic differences between languages. Thus in 
English the subject usually precedes the verb and the verb precedes the object and English is 
called an SVO (subject-verb-object) language, while in Japanese the verb usually comes at 
the end and Japanese is called an SOV language. German is a mixed case Ð in main clauses it 
has verb second (preceded by subject or object or some other item) while in subordinate 
clauses it appears to be SOV. There are two related approaches to these matters taken by 
theoretical linguists. The first is that in a language with two distinct orders, one or both of the 
orders are derived from some single underlying order: German underlyingly always has the 
verb in the same place in all sentences and clauses, but a rule moves the verb to a different 
position. The alternative approach is more ambitious: it is that all languages have the verb in 
the same underlying position, and the differences between languages such as SVO and SOV, 
or verb second, are surface differences derived by rules. Questions of abstractness thus hold 
both within a language and more generally for all languages, with major consequences for 
how we understand variation, and how we interpret typologies of surface variation. 
My goal here is to note briefly a single, very influential, argument about German 
which was first formulated by Hans den Besten in 1977 (Den Besten, 1983) and involves the 
grammatical sentence in (7). 
(7) Er sagte, er komme morgen.͒ 
He said, he comes tomorrow. 
This is a subordinate sentence in which one would expect to find the verb in final position as 
in (13), but now it is in second position and yet the sentence is grammatical. Den Besten 
argued that the crucial factor was not whether the sentence was main or subordinate, but 
whether it related to the ÔcomplementizerÕ of the sentence. The complementizer is an abstract 
component of a sentenceÕs structure, which c-commands the rest of the sentence; in addition 
to providing a place where a word can move to, it also has a function of typing the sentence 
as a question, statement, etc. The complementizer position may or may not be filled by a 
word: it is an abstract form which is not necessarily audible in the spoken sentence. Den 
Besten argued that the complementizer position must be filled in German. If there is a word 
like dass (introducing a sentence as in (4), (5) or (6)) then this word fills the complementizer 
position. If that word is absent, as it is in most main sentences and in the subordinate sentence 
in (7), then the verb fills the complementizer position. If the verb does not fill the 
complementizer position, it is final in a German sentence. The position preceding the second-
position verb is a position preceding the complementizer position, and any item can be 
moved up into it (e.g. the subject, object, adverb). This means incidentally that the subject 
which precedes the second position verb has also been moved to this position and is no longer 
Ôin subject positionÕ. Thus the hypothesis that there is a complementizer position (extensively 
supported by other theoretical work) and the possibility of moving a verb to fill it together 
explain the pattern of verb second in German. 
Den BestenÕs was the first of a series of accounts of verb second which have now 
much elaborated on his account. The sequence of subject, verb, object and other items is 
dependent now on a significant amount of restructuring of underlying abstract structure. The 
rules which do the restructuring (the descendants of the transformational rules of Syntactic 
Structures) are manipulations of abstract structure which are found in all languages. 
1.2.4 Long distance reflexives in Chinese 
My third example of a problem identified by linguistic theory relates to a difference between 
English and Chinese, as illustrated in (8)Ð(9), from Cole et al. (1990). 
(8) [S Zhangsan renwei [S Lisi zhidao [S Wangwu xihuan ziji]]] 
[S Zhangsan thinks [S Lisi knows [S Wangwu like self]]] 
ÔZhangsan thinks that Lisi knows that Wangwu likes himself.Õ (ambiguous: 
Wangwu likes Wangwu, Wangwu likes Lisi, or Wangwu likes Zhangsan) 
(9) [S John thinks [S Tom knows [S Bill likes himself]]] (unambiguous) 
These two sentences are roughly word-for-word equivalents, consisting of a sentence which 
contains a sentence which contains a sentence, each with its own subject. A reflexive pronoun 
must in all languages find a co-referent, which is the NP which co-refers to it. The difference 
is that in the Chinese example (8), the reflexive pronoun ziji ÔselfÕ can have as its co-referent 
any of the three subjects (underlined), and so the overall sentence is ambiguous. In the 
English example (9) the reflexive pronoun himself can have as its co-referent only the subject 
of the sentence which contains it, Bill, and so the overall sentence is unambiguous. Chinese is 
said to have Ôlong distance reflexivesÕ, while English has only local reflexives; this is one of 
the characteristic ways in which languages can vary. I will however show that the Ôlong 
distanceÕ describes how the reflexive is abstractly moved, not how it is interpreted. 
As a general principle, a reflexive pronoun such as ziji or himself must be c-
commanded by its co-referent (the NP which co-refers with the reflexive). Hence it is 
possible to say Bill likes himself but not Himself likes Bill, because the subject c-commands 
the object (as we saw earlier) but not vice versa. Reflexive pronouns in English must also 
find their co-referent within a local domain; they must be in the same sentence. This is why 
(9) has the interpretation that it does. Constituents thus function not only as ways of grouping 
words, but also as domains within which syntactic (and semantic) relationships are 
established; this is further evidence for the reality of syntactic constituent structure. 
Why, then, does Chinese allow the reflexive apparently to find a co-referent in a 
different, higher sentence? The answer offered by Cole et al. is that it does not Ð instead, the 
reflexive is moved by a transformational rule into the higher sentence and thus finds its co-
referent in the same sentence as it ends up in, after movement. Some types of movement have 
an effect on the pronounced order of words (as is the case for verb second in German, for 
example). But movement can also be covert, taking place in the abstract syntax without an 
effect on the phonological output, and Chinese has covert movement of this kind. The 
proposal is as follows (simplified). It depends on the existence of a covert piece of structure, 
similar in kind to the ÔcomplementizerÕ position which we saw in the previous section, but 
this time between the subject and the verb, and which is called the ÔInflÕ position. Generative 
linguists think that all sentences in all languages have such a position (it has very significant 
indirect effects on the syntax of the sentence, including for example controlling whether a 
subject pronominal can be dropped, Ôpro-dropÕ, as discussed later in this chapter). This means 
that sentence (8) has a more elaborated structure, as shown in (10): 
(10) [S Zhangsan Infl renwei [S Lisi Infl zhidao [S Wangwu Infl xihuan ziji]]] 
Now, in Chinese the reflexive pronoun must move to Infl in order to find a co-referent (as a 
rule specific to Chinese, not found in English); but once it moves to Infl it can move to any 
Infl. The three interpretations thus involve covert structures as in (11), (12) and (13). 
(11) [S Zhangsan Infl renwei [S Lisi Infl zhidao [S Wangwu ziji-Infl xihuan ___]]] 
ÔZhangsan thinks that Lisi knows that Wangwu likes Wangwu.Õ 
(12) [S Zhangsan Infl renwei [S Lisi ziji-Infl zhidao [S Wangwu Infl xihuan ___]]] 
ÔZhangsan thinks that Lisi knows that Wangwu likes Lisi.Õ 
(13) [S Zhangsan ziji-Infl renwei [S Lisi Infl zhidao [S Wangwu Infl xihuan ___]]] 
ÔZhangsan thinks that Lisi knows that Wangwu likes Zhangsan.Õ 
Each of the interpretations thus has a different syntactic structure associated with it, thus 
using the syntax to disambiguate the string. This disambiguation takes place by a rule which 
moves a part of the sentence to another place, which has consequences for interpretation but 
no consequences for phonology; in terms of the structure of the grammar in Figure 1.5, the 
movement takes place between S-structure and logical form. 
The difference between English and Chinese is that in Chinese the reflexive moves to 
Infl, and can move to any Infl; in English it does not. The principle remains true for both 
languages that a reflexive always finds its co-referent in the same sentence. This is a 
theoretical way of stating the variation, which is fundamentally different from a more 
surface-oriented way, which would say that in Chinese a reflexive can find its co-referent in a 
different clause. The justification for the approach presented here is that, as Cole et al. show, 
it fits both with general principles but also explains other aspects of Chinese. For example, in 
Chinese, the reflexive pronoun must take a subject as its antecedent not an object. In English 
it is possible to say John told Mary about herself, which is legitimate because the object 
Mary c-commands the reflexive pronoun herself. However, this is not possible in Chinese, 
because in Chinese the equivalent reflexive must move to Infl position before the co-
reference is established, at which point it cannot be c-commanded by the object and so cannot 
find the object as a co-referent. 
Linguistic theory tells us that variation can involve abstract structures which are not 
audible in the pronounced sentence, and can involve ÔtransformationalÕ rules which transform 
one representation of a sentence into another. Certain principles and mechanisms are found in 
all languages: the structural relation of c-command, the Infl node, the principle that reflexives 
must find their antecedents in the same sentence. An account of something that varies 
between languages that can be considered genuinely explanatory must do more than just 
describe the variation. In this case the account provides a single underlying explanation for 
two apparently distinct phenomena (but which prove to co-vary across languages) Ð the 
ability of Chinese reflexives to find a co-referent outside their own clause and the restriction 
that the co-referent can only be a subject. 
1.2.5 Summary: Linguistic problems and generative linguistic 
theory 
In this section I have described three ÔclassicÕ linguistic problems and in each case have 
described one of the possible solutions to these problems. The three solutions all come from 
the ÔgenerativistÕ approach to language, initiated by Chomsky. Other linguistic theories have 
offered other accounts of how to solve these problems. Almost all linguistic theories have 
certain things in common, and I conclude this section by noting two of them, since they are 
relevant to the questions of causal factors in linguistic variation which have been of interest 
to economists. 
<list> 
(i) A linguistic argument focuses on specific problems in the data and shows how their 
solution is part of a larger theory of language. New data is primarily of interest to the 
extent that it challenges or confirms an existing larger theory. Linguistic theories 
change and diverge; none of the accounts here correspond exactly to current accounts 
of the same problems and some current accounts are very different. This is all worth 
emphasizing because the underlying complexity of the problems can be lost in 
descriptive accounts of languages and typological overviews, both of which may be 
radical simplifications of the theoretical approach taken at any specific time. 
(ii) Most linguistic theories are committed to the psychological reality of abstract 
linguistic form which is not audible in the spoken language. This can include 
constituent structure, rules and conditions, and perhaps most significantly the 
possibility that the heard (ÔsurfaceÕ) sequence and form of a word or sentence is not 
the same as its underlying form. Knowledge of a language is largely unconscious 
knowledge of all aspects of its form, including the underlying forms. This is important 
when assessing the extent to which knowledge of a language has ÔWhorfianÕ effects 
on thought or behaviour, because these effects are almost always judged on the 
assumption that only surface form has psychological reality, an assumption which 
linguistic theory shows must be incorrect. 
</list> 
1.3 Linguistic diversity: An illustrative comparison 
between two languages 
Ethnologue is a widely used database of languages, maintained by the SIL organization 
which Ôcontains information on 7,106 known living languagesÕ, and is a subset Ð we do not 
know how small Ð of all the languages which have existed, which currently exist, and which 
will exist in the future. Information about a selection of these languages, and how they vary, 
has been extracted from grammars, articles and other sources, and organized in some major 
typological projects of which the largest and most diverse is probably the World Atlas of 
Language Structures (WALS). This has been used by some economists seeking typological 
correlations between linguistic forms and cultural values. In this section I illustrate linguistic 
diversity and discuss some of the gaps between a language and its representation in a 
database, by looking at specific differences between English and MaÕdi, a language spoken 
mainly in South Sudan and northern Uganda. I am the co-author of the most substantial 
existing grammar of MaÕdi (Blackings and Fabb, 2003), and this grammar is the source of 
most of the information about MaÕdi in WALS. 
When we call MaÕdi or English Ôa languageÕ we are idealizing over a set of dialects 
which are considered to belong together, but which differ from one another: there are at least 
five for MaÕdi, and there are very many for English. MaÕdi is spoken in South Sudan and 
northern Uganda by around a quarter of a million MaÕdi people, and by a diaspora 
population. It is not an official language; the official language of South Sudan is English (one 
of about 60 languages spoken in the country). Most MaÕdis will also speak at least one other 
language, including English, Swahili or Juba Arabic (a dialect of Arabic not necessarily 
understood in the north). Facts like these problematize language-to-nation correlations of the 
kinds made by some economists (and discussed later). 
Languages have common ancestors, most of which have to be reconstructed based on 
familial resemblances. MaÕdi is classified as belonging to the subfamily Central Sudanic of 
the genus Moru-MaÕdi and the family Nilo-Saharan; in principle this might mean that MaÕdi 
is one descendent of a hypothetical language which we could call proto-Nilo-Saharan. 
English is classified as belonging to the genus Germanic of the family Indo-European, and 
may be a descendent of a language which might be called proto-Indo-European. Note that 
though classified as in the genus Germanic, English has also been strongly influenced by 
French (in the genus Romance) and other European languages (because of its mixed history 
and the influence of French speakers in mediaeval Britain). There is no known ancestor 
connecting proto-Indo-European and proto-Nilo-Saharan, and perhaps there is indeed none. 
For a sceptical discussion of the possibility of ancient common ancestors for contemporary 
language families, see Nichols (2012). 
In the remainder of this section I look at a selection of variations between languages, 
as manifested by differences between English and MaÕdi, and begin with the sounds of 
languages. WALS is divided into chapters of which Chapter 1 (Maddieson, 2013) compares 
Ôconsonant inventoriesÕ; I refer to this as WALS-1. If we look at its inventory of consonants, 
we find that MaÕdi has more consonants than English, mainly because the inventory of MaÕdi 
includes complex consonants such as [kp]. For WALS, MaÕdi would be classified as having a 
Ômoderately largeÕ inventory, compared to the English ÔaverageÕ. The languages in WALS-1 
vary in size between 6 and 122 consonants. Maddieson notes that theory influences any 
decision about how many consonants there are (as is true of every aspect of WALS). MaÕdi 
has some types of consonants not found in English, with three implosive consonants 
including the [ɗ] of mɗ, which is the name of the language ([ɗ] is orthographically written 
as apostrophe-d as in MaÕdi). Implosives require the closure of the vocal tract followed by an 
intake of air (rather than the more usual expulsion of air), and are found mainly in this part of 
Africa according to WALS-7 (Maddieson, 2013). English has types of consonants not found 
in MaÕdi including the dental non-sibilant fricative consonants [ð] and [θ] (the initial 
consonants of this and thick respectively); these are also quite rare cross-linguistically but 
unlike the implosives belong to a rare consonant type which is scattered throughout the 
worldÕs languages (WALS-19, Maddieson, 2013). 
Now consider the inventory of vowels (WALS-2, Maddieson, 2013), where we find 
the reverse situation. English has a large vowel inventory, though the actual vowels (and the 
number of vowels) vary greatly between dialects; the inventoryÕs size and variation are partly 
due to the complex relation between long and short vowels in the history of English. In 
contrast, MaÕdi has an average vowel inventory of nine with no distinction between long and 
short. MaÕdi (but not English) vowels are differentiated into those with Ôadvanced tongue 
rootÕ and Ôretracted tongue rootÕ (differentiated by how far retracted the root of the tongue is, 
with no direct equivalent in English). In MaÕdi, there is also an interesting rule in operation, 
which is that the vowel of an affix will (depending on other factors) take on the same 
advanced tongue root characteristic as the main word it is attached to. Thus for example the 
word [tū] means ÔclimbÕ and has an advanced tongue root vowel; if the prefix meaning 
ÔrepeatedlyÕ is added to it the word is [ūt], so that the vowel of the prefix is also advanced 
tongue root. If the same prefix is added to the word [zɔ̄] ÔgrowÕ to form the word [ʊ̄zɔ́] we 
find that the vowel of the prefix is now retracted tongue root. A phonological rule is in 
operation here (just as we saw a phonological rule in Section 1.2, with the vowel shift). This 
is not just a variation in vowel inventory but a variation in the rules which apply within a 
word: MaÕdi has a Ôvowel harmonyÕ process which harmonizes features of a vowel within a 
word. Various kinds of vowel harmony process are found throughout the worldÕs languages 
(but not in English). 
Consonants and vowels are combined into syllables, and languages can vary in the 
types of syllables they permit (WALS-12, Maddieson, 2013). MaÕdi is classified as having a 
Ôsimple syllable structureÕ allowing only two types of syllable, either consonant plus vowel or 
just vowel. English allows both of these plus other types of syllable and has Ôcomplex 
syllable structureÕ. Maddieson in WALS-12 chapter notes that there is a correlation in the 
database between having simple syllables and having smaller consonant inventories (though 
this is not true for MaÕdi), and raises the (unanswered) question of Ôwhether the association 
should be attributed to accidents of survival and spread of particular languages, or can be 
proposed as reflecting a design feature of language viewed as a wholeÕ. This is typical of the 
problems which are presented by theoretical explanations for linguistic diversity. 
MaÕdi is a tone language (WALS-13, Maddieson, 2013), whereas English is not. In a 
tone language, the pitch or pitch contours on the syllables (i.e. its tone) are used to distinguish 
one word from another, such that a word has a specific tone pattern. Thus the MaÕdi word s 
with high tone means ÔtailÕ, the word sā with mid-tone means Ôto plant or scourÕ, and the 
word s with low tone means Ôto intervene and bring a fight to the endÕ; the consonant and 
vowel is the same in each word, only the tone varies. I now discuss three of the many 
complexities in the use of tone in MaÕdi.  
First, while in principle any type of syllable can carry any of the three tones, there are 
some restrictions: thus in a two-syllable word there are nine possible tonal sequences, but the 
sequence high-low is associated with words borrowed into the language from another 
language such as Arabic or English: all borrowed disyllables have this pattern, and all but two 
words in the language with this pattern are borrowed words. Longer borrowed words also 
have stereotyped tonal patterns. This illustrates that a language is not uniform in its 
properties: different types of vocabulary might be subject to different generalizations. A 
second aspect of tone in MaÕdi is that some prefixes or suffixes are just Ôfloating tonesÕ with 
no vowel or consonant involved. For example, the past and the non-past (present, future) 
forms of the verb are distinguished just by adding a low tone to the beginning of the non-past 
verb. 
A third example involving tone demonstrates a case where tonally the spoken form of 
a word is not the same as its abstract form. MaÕdi has a grammatical word drʊ meaning 
something like Ôanalogous toÕ which appears with one of two distinct tones, either high tone 
drʊ́ or mid-tone drʊ̄. It has a mid-tone if it follows a word with a high tone, but if it follows a 
word with a mid- or low tone it has a high tone. Based on what we know about other 
languages, one possibility is that this is a ÔcontourÕ effect which requires contrast between 
adjacent linguistic elements, so that the tone on the word is different from the preceding tone. 
However, contour effects of this kind tend to be general within a language and not 
idiosyncratic to specific words, as is the case here. Blackings and Fabb (2003, p. 62) offer a 
different explanation, based on the difference between underlying and surface forms. We 
suggest that the word has the underlying form HIGH-drʊ̄, that is, that it has two tones, of 
which the first is an initial floating high tone (annotated HIGH) unattached to a vowel and the 
second is a mid-tone attached to the vowel [ʊ]. This is the form in which the word is stored in 
the mental lexicon, but it is never pronounced in this way. Instead, it is pronounced in one of 
two ways. If the word follows a high-toned vowel, its own initial floating high tone 
assimilates to the high tone of the preceding vowel, and the mid-tone remains on the word. If 
the word follows a non-high-toned vowel (i.e. mid or low) the high tone cannot assimilate to 
the preceding word and instead shifts rightwards to displace the mid-tone on the word, ending 
up on the vowel [ʊ]. Here again we see a phonological rule in operation which mediates 
between the abstract underlying form and the surface spoken form. This type of account 
localizes the effect on the word (so we would not expect it to show up on any other word) but 
it uses rules and other principles of structure which allow floating tones, assimilation of 
tones, and the possibility of a high tone displacing a mid-tone: these rules are seen more 
generally in other aspects of MaÕdi, thus justifying their use here. The more generally 
explanatory an abstract explanation of this kind is, the better the explanation. 
Morphology is the shape of a word such as the use of prefixes and suffixes. In MaÕdi 
the past form of the verb is unmarked (it has no special morphology), while the non-past is 
marked (with special morphology) because it has a prefix (which is a floating low tone). In 
English the same past vs non-past distinction is made, but in contrast the non-past is 
unmarked (e.g. jump) while it is the past which is marked with a suffix (as in jumped). 
Another morphological difference between the languages relates to the marking of plurality 
on a noun; in English, most plural nouns have a suffix (or are irregular), while in MaÕdi, most 
kinds of noun are morphologically the same in singular and plural with the exception of 
nouns of gender, age, kinship and occupation, which are marked for plural by changing the 
tonal pattern on the word. This restriction of plurality to human nouns is cross-linguistically 
quite common (WALS-34, Haspelmath, 2013). However, (again unlike English) almost all 
MaÕdi adjectives can be pluralized, where plural is indicated by changing the tone pattern on 
the adjective. MaÕdi has no grammatical gender, in common with more than half the 
languages surveyed in WALS (WALS-30, 31, 32, Corbett, 2013); English has grammatical 
gender only in the pronouns, which WALS describes as cross-linguistically rare. Note that 
deterministic accounts of the relation between language and culture, which are particularly 
tempting when it comes to meanings relating to gender, would have to steer a careful path 
through the complexity of these differences, a complexity which is typical of all languages. 
Languages can vary in their grammatical words. The English articles a and the come 
before the noun; the articles in MaÕdi come after the noun. In English, an indefinite singular 
NP must usually have the indefinite article a, but in MaÕdi, an equivalent NP can omit the 
article. There are several definite articles in MaÕdi, one being a low tone suffix added to the 
noun which is used to indicate that the noun has a unique referent, another is the word r!̀ 
which is used when the NP refers to something which has been earlier mentioned in the 
discourse (the closest equivalent to English the), and another word nā used when the referent 
has very recently been mentioned. The rules for which determiner to use, both in terms of 
meaning, and also in terms of syntactic context, are very complex in MaÕdi. The complexity 
of the data around these articles in MaÕdi is not reflected in WALS, which includes two 
specific classificatory points about MaÕdi, one that (like English) the definite and 
demonstrative words are different, and the other that it is described as having Ôno indefinite 
but definite articleÕ, which is partly true, but must be finessed. This demonstrates that the 
database necessarily under-represents the complexity of the data, a point which I have made 
repeatedly in this section and which has significant consequences for the final section of this 
chapter where I consider economistsÕ uses of this and similar databases. 
Pronouns are another class of grammatical words which have drawn the attention of 
economists, as we will see. MaÕdi has distinct pronouns for first person singular and plural 
(like English I and we), but also has a third pronoun which can express either ÔI and youÕ 
(inclusive first and second person) or ÔsomeoneÕ (indefinite third person). MaÕdi has distinct 
pronouns for second person singular and plural (unlike English you which is used for both) 
but this is purely a distinction of number and does not express social relations (hence, unlike 
tu and vous in French). In the third person, unlike English, MaÕdi tends to use the same 
pronouns for both, and plurality is instead marked by a distinct word k!́Õ or p!̄ (the latter 
meaning Ôand associatesÕ). So the system of pronouns is different from the system in English, 
along many dimensions. This is further complicated by the fact that the realization of a 
pronoun depends on the function of the pronoun in the sentence (as in English, where I is the 
subject and me the object form); in MaÕdi there are three distinct forms of the subject pronoun 
depending on whether it is the subject of an uninflected (past) verb, of an inflected (non-past) 
verb, or of a directive verb, and a further distinct form for object pronouns. The pronoun is 
sometimes realized as a distinct word (or two distinct words if one includes the plural 
marker), and sometimes as a prefix on the verb. 
Any account of the pronominals of MaÕdi must make theoretical assumptions, 
including assumptions about underlying forms which are not necessarily the same as those on 
the surface. Thus for example there are two forms of the first person singular pronoun 
preceding an uninflected (past) verb, one just a prefix  and one a longer form m. They do 
not differ significantly in meaning. In Blackings and Fabb (2003, p. 136) we suggest that the 
longer form is actually a sequence of two pronouns with the same meaning, the default first 
person pronoun mā (also used for object pronouns), preceding the prefix , and both are 
merged and the high tone replaces the mid-tone (a process seen elsewhere, e.g. in drʊ́, 
discussed above). As we will see later in this chapter, one influential economics article builds 
a theory by extracting very simplified differences from typological data about pronouns; my 
goal here is to show that such linguistic data may often be far from simple. The MaÕdi system 
of pronouns is also relevant to the issue of how data is analysed and how it feeds into 
typological databases. What we identify as a third person pronoun k has been analysed in 
other work on MaÕdi as an auxiliary verb; this is a very significant difference typologically, 
and both views cannot be right (but someone forming a database must make a choice between 
these incompatible alternatives, often silently). 
Consider now tense and aspect. Tense is a modification of a verb to indicate the 
relative location of an event in time; in English the verb can have one of two tenses, either as 
in ate or walked which are past, or as in eat or walk which are non-past because they can be 
used for present or future. Futurity can also be expressed periphrastically by using a modal 
verb will or shall. As we will see in Section 1.5, differences in how tense works in a language 
are taken to be significant for economics by Chen (2013). Aspect is a modification of the 
verb to represent the internal temporal constituency of the event, with perfective aspect 
representing the event as a single unit, and imperfective aspect representing the event as 
internally granular, and interruptable. In English there is no clear grammaticalization of this 
distinction but imperfective is expressed periphrastically. A periphrastic expression of a 
meaning uses two or more words, and thus differs from a grammaticalized expression which 
uses one word (including its internal morphology). The periphrastic expression of 
imperfective in English uses the progressive form as in the sentence I am eating. If not 
progressive, an English verb is usually interpreted as perfective. Thus the sentence I ate the 
sandwich when he entered the room is best interpreted by treating the two verbs 
(perfectively) as representing single whole units and ordered one after another, while the 
sentence I was eating the sandwich when he entered the room is interpreted as the second 
(perfective) event coming in the middle of the first (imperfective) event. In MaÕdi, tense and 
aspect are expressed not only by modification of the verb, but also by major differences in 
sentence structure. This is illustrated below. The primary distinction is between past and non-
past, and the distinction of aspect between perfective and imperfective is parasitic on this 
(with complications, Blackings and Fabb, 2003, p. 172). 
(14) ɔ̄-ɲā gbnd 
he-eat cassava 
Ôhe ate cassavaÕ (past, and perfective) 
(15) k gbnd  ̀-ɲā 
he cassava nonpast-eat 
Ôhe is eating cassavaÕ (or Ôhe eats cassavaÕ) (non-past, and imperfective) 
The past verb carries no inflection, while the non-past verb has a prefix added to it which is a 
floating low tone. In addition, the past verb precedes its object (SVO order) while the non-
past verb follows its object (SOV order). And the subject pronouns are different, with a prefix 
on the past verb and a separate pronominal on the non-past verb. However, when the sentence 
is negative, the Ôpast tenseÕ version of the syntax and morphology is used for both past and 
non-past, and the tense distinction is instead expressed entirely by a choice between one of 
two negation words. 
(16) ɔ̄-ɲā gbnd kʊ̄rʊ́ 
he-eat cassava not (past) 
Ôhe did not eat cassavaÕ 
(17) ɔ̄-ɲā gbnd kʊ̄ 
he-eat cassava not (non-past) 
Ôhe does not eat cassavaÕ (or Ôhe is not eating cassavaÕ, or Ôhe will not eat cassavaÕ) 
I know of no published theoretical explanation of why these various differences Ð inflection 
of the verb, pronominal, and word order Ð all align, and why the differences disappear when 
the sentence is negated. I outline briefly a possible solution now, noting the relation between 
this problem and the problems around verb position and Ôverb secondÕ described in Section 
1.2. I start by proposing that the two syntactic structures are underlyingly the same, that the 
underlying word order is SVO, and that tense is expressed abstractly at the right-hand end of 
the sentence. The specific rule is that when tense is non-past, some word which can express 
tense must be in this position. When a negation word occupies this position it picks up the 
non-past tense; if there is no negation then the non-past tense must be carried by something 
else and so the verb moves (rightwards past the object) to the tense position and picks up the 
tense as an inflection, thus producing the surface order. The subject pronoun would be 
realized as a separate word when no longer adjacent to the verb. This type of account 
hypothesizes abstract underlying word orders (and pronominal expression, etc.) which are not 
the same as those on the surface. It also introduces a theoretical claim which goes against one 
of the current cross-linguistic generalizations in generative linguistics, which is the Ôfinal-
over-final constraintÕ (Biberauer et al., 2007): this generalization predicts that a verb which 
precedes its object should not be moveable to a position which follows its sentence, as here. 
This means either that this explanation is incorrect or that the principle is incorrect, or that 
there is some other complicating factor: in this way, linguistic theory develops. MaÕdi is 
classified by WALS as having no dominant word order (i.e. neither SVO or SOV), but a 
more abstract analysis which properly explains the patterns in the language might in fact find 
that it does have a dominant SVO word order with the other derived from it (Dryer, 2013 
devotes a discussion in WALS-144 to MaÕdi negation and word order, noting that only five 
described languages, all from the same area, show this pattern). 
As a last example of a variation found in MaÕdi, note that while (18) below is a 
grammatical sentence, (19) is not. 
(18) ɔ̄-ɲā dȝ"ń!̄ 
he-eat yesterday 
Ôhe ate yesterdayÕ 
(19) * ɔ̄-ɲā 
he-eat 
Ôhe ateÕ 
Sentence (19) is ungrammatical, as indicated by the asterisk preceding it. One of the 
important devices of theoretical linguistics which is not always reflected in descriptive 
grammars is the notion of ungrammaticality: speakers are able to distinguish between 
possible and impossible utterances in their language. My co-author Mairi Blackings and I 
visited a group of expatriate MaÕdi speakers to discuss their intuitions of the language. They 
agreed that they could say (18) but not (19) and thought nothing of it; I have striking 
memories of their amusement when I pointed out that when they spoke English they had no 
such distinction between the two perfectly acceptable sentences He ate yesterday and He ate. 
They were surprised by this observation about the difference between two languages, both of 
which they spoke, and this neatly illustrates that judgements about grammaticality in a 
language are generally unconscious. No one taught them the fact about MaÕdi that the 
uninflected (ÔpastÕ) verb cannot be the last word in a sentence; it must be followed by 
something else, which is here the word for ÔyesterdayÕ but could equally be other words. 
There is no published explanation for this and indeed it is not picked up in WALS and may 
perhaps be unique as a surface characteristic of a language. However, a theoretical linguist 
would ask whether it is the surface result of underlying patterns and rules which are found 
elsewhere but here producing a unique surface result due to the rules operating in a unique 
combination. 
In this section I have indicated some of the ways in which English and MaÕdi differ; 
my intention has been to show some of the complexity of the data presented by any language, 
many of which remain unexplained and demand theoretical linguistic study. We have seen 
that though these differences can be represented to some extent in the WALS project, it can 
not really represent the complexity of the data or the possibility that the variation on the 
surface masks underlying similarities. As linguists, the authors of WALS are fully aware of 
this: it is an inevitable result of the simplifying process needed to produce the patterns in the 
Ôbig dataÕ. However, this may not be recognized by non-linguists who draw on the simplified 
version in WALS, particularly in order to produce binarities which can be correlated with 
social or economic behaviour, as we will see in Section 1.5. 
1.4 Theories of linguistic diversity 
The forms of languages vary, but within limits: it is possible to imagine kinds of language 
which do not exist. MaÕdi and English have certain forms in common, as demonstrated by the 
fact that they can be described by similar theoretical terminologies. When they vary from one 
another they vary in specific ways, such that they fit into bigger but still limited patterns of 
how languages can vary. In this section, I summarize different views on why languages have 
certain forms in common, and why they vary. I begin with the current version of generative 
linguistics, which is a very widely used linguistic theory. I then consider alternative accounts 
of linguistic form which argue that form is determined in part by external factors. 
1.4.1 Chomsky, universal grammar, and the theory of principles 
and parameters 
A form of the generative linguistic theory introduced by Chomsky in Syntactic Structures is 
the theory of Ôprinciples and parametersÕ. This theory formulates a notion of universal 
grammar as a set of principles and parameters which govern how language is structured, and 
which is available as a cognitive capacity to all humans as a genetic inheritance. This is both 
a theory of linguistic form and a theory of the psychology of language. Rizzi (2013) offers an 
overview of the theory and introduces a collection of articles which discuss various aspects of 
it, including Cinque (2013) on typology. Like all theories of linguistic diversity, this remains 
a hypothesis, with many adherents but also with many competitors. 
The psychological part of the theory proposes that all humans have an innate language 
faculty. This faculty enables the learning of language and hence determines what the possible 
forms of a language are. For this reason, all languages are predicted to conform to certain 
principles. Where there are variations between languages, some of these variations arise from 
determinate possibilities of variation which are set by the language faculty as ÔparametersÕ 
which allow for one of various options to be selected. Thus for example, a parameter may 
provide options: the choice of a specific option in a parameter determines that an article 
precedes the noun (as in English) and the choice of a different option in the same parameter 
determines that an article follows the noun (as in MaÕdi). The effects of parameter settings are 
likely to be indirect and interact with other parameters (i.e. my previous sentence 
oversimplifies: there is unlikely to be a parameter directly determining article position, but 
article position may be determined by the parameter setting interacting with other parameter 
settings, along with innate rules of the language system). Other parameters might be set to 
determine whether the language has Ôverb secondÕ, whether it has an SOV or SVO order, 
whether it has long distance reflexives or not (but noting as for long distance reflexives that 
these parameters might be quite abstract, and have these as surface effects). 
Parameter-setting is how a language is learned. When exposed to a language spoken 
around it, the child learns that language by making choices from the parameters, fixing a set 
of interacting variables to produce that specific language. Chomsky offers an argument of 
Ôpoverty of stimulusÕ, that the data to which the child is exposed does not offer enough 
information on its own to enable the child to learn the language; instead the child must 
already ÔknowÕ certain aspects of the language and what its possible forms might be as part of 
his or her innate language faculty. The notion of universal grammar, which is the basis of the 
theory of principles and parameters, is a radical one: that all languages conform to certain 
basic principles, and that certain differences between them are based on the selection of 
specific pre-determined variants (ÔparametersÕ). 
1.4.2 Cultural evolution and linguistic diversity 
Evans and Levinson (2009, p. 429) suggest that languages can in principle vary in any way at 
all, and that the forms of languages which currently exist do so as a combination of historical 
accident and other forces, but do not involve any language-specific faculty of the kind 
proposed by Chomsky: Ôalthough there are significant recurrent patterns in organization, 
these are better explained as stable engineering solutions satisfying multiple design 
constraints, reflecting both cultural-historical factors and the constraints of human cognitionÕ. 
They offer evidence for this claim by citing specific kinds of variation which they suggest 
cannot be reduced to underlying universals, though it should be noted that generativists who 
have responded to this article disagree with the linguistic evidence offered or its 
interpretation, and suggest that underlying universals can in fact be found. Evans and 
LevinsonÕs proposal is that languages change and diverge in parallel with the changing and 
diverging cultures of their speakers. The reasons for similarities between languages is in part 
the same reason that there are similarities between cultures: languages and cultures have split 
apart over time, but there has not been enough time for major divergences to emerge. Another 
reason for similarities between languages is that there are external pressures, in part from 
general principles of cognition and in part from the environment, which limit variation. They 
take a slightly ÔWhorfianÕ position here about causal relations between general cognition and 
language (Evans and Levinson, 2009, p. 436), citing earlier work by Levinson (2003) 
proposing that spatial cognition is causally related to the grammaticalization of spatial 
reference in a language (argued against by Li and Gleitman, 2002 and others, as noted in the 
next section). Evans and Levinson make a claim about the species-specificity of human 
language which is opposed, at a philosophical level, to that of Chomsky. Whereas Chomsky 
proposes that what distinguishes us as a species is that all of our languages are fundamentally 
alike, Evans and Levinson propose that we are distinguished as a species because our 
communication systems are fundamentally diverse. 
1.4.3 Dediu and Ladd 
Dediu and Ladd (2007) develop an account of the diversification of languages based on 
genetic discoveries by others, including Bruce LahnÕs lab at the University of Chicago. They 
suggest that there is a correlation between the genetic difference and whether the populations 
differentiated genetically in these ways have a tone language or not. This is not an individual-
level finding: in principle, any human (i.e. with any genetic make-up) can learn any human 
language (i.e. with any variety of linguistic form). However, Dediu and Ladd suggest that 
genetic factors can form a slight bias in what can be learned and how it is learned, and that 
over a population and over time, a collection of slight biases might lead to a population 
speaking a language with certain formal characteristics. They focus specifically on the 
learning of tone languages, and suggest that there is a genetic factor in some populations 
which makes a tone language easier for members of that population to learn. MaÕdi, the 
language discussed earlier, is a tone language, and tone languages are quite common in 
certain areas of the world (e.g. Sub-Saharan Africa, South East Asia, Central America) and 
quite rare in others (e.g. Europe, North Africa, Australia). There are some languages (e.g. 
Japanese, Basque) with intermediate status, and dialects of a language can differ in whether 
they are tonal (Dediu and Ladd, 2007, p. 10945). They focus on two previously discovered 
alternative forms of genes (alleles), which are ASPM-D and MCPH-D, which emerged in 
some populations at an estimated 5.8 thousand years and 37 thousand years ago respectively: 
Ôthose areas of the world where the new alleles are relatively rare also tend to be the areas 
where tone languages are commonÕ (ibid.). They propose that there is a causal relation 
between genetics and language, such that the genetic structure of a population can exert an 
influence on the language spoken. They propose that ASPM-D and MCPH-D have an effect 
on the brain areas involved in linguistic tone. This may produce a bias depending on whether 
one has these alleles, possibly by their making non-tone languages easier to learn. They note 
that there are many other contributing factors and that their findings do not support a racial or 
deterministic interpretation. The evolutionary suggestion is that, at some earlier stage, all 
languages may have been tone languages, but populations emerged with the new alleles 
which made it harder to learn tone languages, and so non-tone languages emerged. Dediu and 
LaddÕs proposal has been widely discussed, because it offers a rare argument that genetic 
differences in human populations might be causally connected with language variation. 
1.4.4 Linguistic theory and language diversity 
Berwick et al. (2011, p. 3) suggest that there are four interacting factors which can determine 
why languages are different from one another. The first set of factors are innate and domain-
specific (specific to language); these are the abstract elements of linguistic form as described 
for example by principles and parameters theory. Generative linguistics has always 
fundamentally concerned itself with these factors; opponents of this theory such as Evans and 
Levinson argue that these factors do not exist (i.e. that there is no innate language faculty). 
The second set of factors are innate and domain-general. These might include general aspects 
of perception, memory or other aspects of cognition which might have causal effects on the 
forms of language, and allow for or determine variations in languages; Dediu and LaddÕs 
proposal stands here, in addition to the very different ÔWhorfianÕ proposals that language has 
a causal relation with thought. The third set of factors are external stimuli, including exposure 
to language: Evans and Levinson (2009) think that the cultural environment plays a major 
role in determining linguistic factors. The fourth set of factors involve natural laws including 
computational efficiency: it may be that language takes the forms it does, and varies within 
certain limits or in certain ways, for reasons of computational efficiency. 
A proponent of principles and parameters theory might allow all four types of factor 
to contribute to the shape of any specific language; however, a crucial component of this 
theory is that innate factors play an important role in constraining the effects of the other 
factors, and limiting overall variation. Other theorists such as Evans and Levinson exclude 
the possibility of innate factors. The balance between external and internal factors, and 
between domain-specific (to language) and domain-general factors, is a matter of theoretical 
debate, based on the analysis of patterns and generalizations in the linguistic data (as shown 
in the previous two sections). It also depends on what one accepts as linguistic form. The key 
claim by Evans and Levinson is that surface linguistic forms are too diverse to be 
accommodated to universal principles as found in a faculty of language; the main response by 
generativists is that it is not at the level of surface forms but at the level of abstract forms 
(from which the surface is derived) that the underlying uniformities can be discovered. The 
debate around linguistic theory and language diversity is thus fundamentally a debate about 
whether there can be certain kinds of abstract linguistic form. This has relevance for the next 
section of this chapter, in which I explore the ÔWhorfianÕ view that linguistic form has a 
causal relation with thought and behaviour, a view which has a following in the economics 
literature. 
1.5 Whorfian psychology and economics: causal 
relations between language and thought 
In this section I explore proposals that specific linguistic forms have a correlation with 
thought, and the possibility in particular that language causes thought, such that the language 
one speaks leads one to think or behave in certain ways. If true, these claims might suggest 
that linguistic diversity might have a causal relation with cultural diversity. This approach 
requires a psychological mechanism by which language causes thought, and a mechanism of 
historical change by which languages and kinds of thought change over time such that the 
claimed psychological causation can create and sustain correlations between linguistic form 
and thought over time. This is called a ÔWhorfianÕ approach to language and thought. Projects 
seeking causal relations along these lines have recently been pursued by economists, and I 
discuss some of their arguments here. 
The notion that language has a causal relation with thought and behaviour is 
particularly associated with the writings of Edward Sapir (1884Ð1939) and Benjamin Lee 
Whorf (1897Ð1941), and is sometimes called the ÔSapirÐWhorf hypothesisÕ though here I call 
it ÔWhorfianÕ. Surveys of Whorfian ideas include the favourable account by Hill and 
Mannheim (1992), the account by Lucy (1997), and the hostile account by Gleitman and 
Papafragou (2005). Whorfianism has been of interest to psychologists and to economists, as 
well as others studying language and cognition in society, culture or business. Psychologists 
construct experiments to test whether language determines observable aspects of cognition. 
Both pro- and anti-Whorfian psycholinguistic findings exist, and there is no final agreement 
on this. Economists (and sociologists) propose causal relations between values for some 
linguistic variable derived from linguistic typology and values for social variables associated 
with the countries in which the languages are spoken; all the correlational studies which I 
discuss later in this section propose a causal link (possibly in the distant past) and so affirm a 
Whorfian hypothesis. If there is a causal link, this must be mediated through a causal relation 
between language and individual psychology, which is why it is relevant to consider the 
psycholinguistic evidence for Whorfianism. 
Most theoretical linguists tend to be hostile to Whorfianism, whose early arguments, 
including WhorfÕs account of the expression of time in the American language Hopi, and 
claims about the vocabulary of colour relative to colour perception, did not survive fuller 
scrutiny of the data. However, there are many data-specific Whorfian arguments which claim 
that language causes thought, and each argument needs to be examined on its merits. Most of 
the rest of this section looks at specific arguments, and casts doubt in particular on those 
arguments which have been developed by economists. There are two fundamental bases from 
which theoretical linguists criticize Whorfian arguments. First, linguistic data is very 
complex; Whorfian arguments often extract binarities from simplified typological data which 
is a very attenuated version of the complexity of actual data. Second, what we know when we 
know a language may include very abstract representations, rather different from what we see 
on the surface. The idea which underlies much linguistic theory and particularly generative 
linguistics is that languages are much more alike abstractly than they are on the surface; 
hence there is not as much cognitively relevant linguistic variety as appears from the 
Whorfian adoption of surface typological variation. Gleitman and Papafragou (2005, p. 654) 
make this point when they say that Ômuch discussion about the relationship between language 
and thought has been colored by an underlying disagreement about the nature of language 
itselfÕ. 
I now discuss three sets of psychological experiments which test Whorfian ideas. 
Each of these involves an initial claim that Whorfianism is demonstrated, followed by one or 
more rebuttals. They indicate the potential fragility of Whorfian arguments. 
<list> 
(i) Bloom (1981) noted a difference between English and Chinese (Mandarin) in how 
they expressed counterfactuals (the statement of something which might but need not 
be the case). In English, the subjunctive form of the verb can be used, such as were in 
If she were to come, she would be here by now. In Chinese, counterfactuality is not 
expressed on the morphology of the verb, but is expressed pariphrastically (using the 
arrangement of words in the sentence), as e.g. Ôif X then YÕ. Bloom claimed that the 
direct expression of counterfactuality on the verb enabled monolingual English 
speakers to formulate better counterfactual interpretations of a story, as demonstrated 
by an experiment he conducted. However, Au (1983) showed that this effect could not 
be experimentally reproduced, argued that it was an artefact of how the experiment 
was constructed, and that different ways of setting up the experiment had results in 
which Chinese speakers were better at constructing counterfactuals, hence offering no 
evidence for Whorfianism. 
(ii) In some languages, position is described allocentrically (relative to the person) and in 
others, deictically (e.g. relative to a compass point), so that in the latter type of 
language someone might say Ôthe spoon is to the north of the coffee cupÕ. Levinson 
(1996, 1997) describes experiments in which the spatial reasoning of subjects is 
affected by which of these types of language they speak, and this is cited as one of the 
functionalist arguments in Evans and Levinson (2009). However, Li and Gleitman 
(2002) and Li et al. (2011) argue against the validity of these experiments, on the 
basis of their own experiments and alternative explanations. They argue that the 
difference in experimental results comes from environmental and contextual factors 
impinging on the subjects, not from the differences in language. They say that 
Ôambient spatial circumstancesÕ may be independently a factor both in the language 
used and in the spatial reasoning, but there is no independent causal relation between 
language and spatial reasoning. Thus Li et al. (2011, p. 51) claim that Ôspatial 
reasoning is flexible and largely independent of the implied dictates of linguistic 
encodingÕ. They emphasize the experimental subjectÕs reasoning about intentions and 
communication in the situation of being in an experiment, and suggest that this 
explains some of the effects reported by Levinson. Again, if these counter-arguments 
are right, this Whorfian argument fails. 
(iii) A third argument relates to languages in which temporal sequence can be expressed 
vertically so that April is described as ÔupÕ relative to May which is ÔdownÕ. Chinese 
(Mandarin) is such a language, while English is not. Boroditsky (2001, p. 18) 
conducted experiments which presented horizontal and vertical visual primes before 
asking for judgements about temporal sequence and concluded that ÔMandarin 
speakers relied on a ÒMandarinÓ way of thinking about time even when they were 
thinking about English sentences. Mandarin speakers were more likely to think about 
time vertically when deciding whether ÒMarch comes earlier than AprilÓÕ. It is 
important to note that Boroditsky shows that this effect can be altered very quickly by 
training English speakers to use vertical terms to talk about time, and then testing 
them, in which case their behaviours are similar to speakers of Mandarin. These 
proposed Whorfian effects of language are thus not deep-rooted in thought, but seem 
to be highly manipulable in the experimental situation. However, January and Kako 
(2007), Chen (2007) and Bender et al. (2010), all separately re-ran the experiments 
and were unable to reproduce the findings. Chen concludes that ÔChinese speakers do 
not conceptualize time differently than English speakersÕ (2007 p. 436). Again, there 
is no clear evidence for Whorfianism here. 
</list> 
These are three attempts to demonstrate Whorfian effects experimentally for three different 
aspects of a language. In each case, there are arguments for and arguments against. The 
debate continues, involving these and other aspects of linguistic form. The best conclusion 
for now is that there is no general agreement in psychology and psycholinguistics that 
specific forms of language cause specific forms of thought. 
In the remainder of this section, I examine papers by economists which claim 
correlations between features of language and cultural values, and more specifically claim 
that language causes thought, or that thought (and perception) causes language to take on 
specific forms. Gay et al. (2013, p. 32) say:  
since grammatical features often force us to encode certain aspects of reality to the 
exclusion of other aspects, it follows that applying an evolutionary perspective to 
grammar formation could well reveal selective pressures to codify the most relevant 
or salient aspects of our ancestorsÕ reality, including culture and past economic 
specialization.  
I interpret this to mean that the cultural values of a group of people (ancestors) caused 
linguistic forms to come into existence, perhaps in a situation where the linguistic system 
offers alternatives, and selection of the chosen alternative is biased by cultural values. This is 
opposite from the causal direction explored by psycholinguists, and is of course very 
speculative as it involves unobservable past processes. However, it is probably true to say 
that most of the economics articles also assume that causation is in the other direction, that 
language causes cultural values; here a comparison with relevant psycholinguistic 
experiments is useful. 
1.5.1 Grammatical gender and biological sex 
In many languages, nouns are grouped into classes called ÔgendersÕ, where class membership 
is manifested as agreement, where the features of one word affect or determine the features of 
an article or other word (Corbett, 1991). Thus for example in the West African language Fula, 
ɲiiwa ÔelephantÕ belongs to a gender (along with other large animals and the word for ÔfieldÕ) 
which takes the article ba, i.e. ɲiiwa ba Ôthe elephantÕ, while dɛbbɔ ÔwomanÕ belongs to a 
gender (along with other nouns including both male and female humans) which takes the 
article ʔa. In this Fula linguistic classification, biological sex has little connection to the 
classification of nouns, but it is still called ÔgenderÕ. In other languages, including those 
discussed here, there is a substantial correlation between biological sex and gender, such that 
nouns for men may be classified as in one gender, and nouns for women as in another gender. 
Does grammatical gender have a causal influence on cognition? The main focus of 
psychological research has been on how grammatical gender affects thinking about non-
sexed objects which have grammatical genders (such as tables and chairs), in languages 
including Spanish and German. Boroditsky et al. (2003) summarize experiments whose 
results suggest that the grammatical gender of (non-sexed) objects affects how people think 
about those objects. These objects (without natural gender or sex) have conceptual gender 
associated with the grammatical gender assigned to them in a language: Ôdifferences in 
grammar, with no concomitant differences in culture, are enough to influence how people 
think about objectsÕ (ibid., p. 72). They suggest that it is because objects are grouped into 
categories by grammatical gender that other similarities are assigned to them as a group. It is 
significant that this arises even for an invented language with grammatical genders taught to 
English speakers, who immediately associate other gendered characteristics with the objects 
(ibid., p. 71). As in Boroditsky (2001) cited above, Boroditsky et al. (2003) show that it is 
possible to undo the influence of language on the subject very easily, suggesting that there is 
not a deep relation between oneÕs language and oneÕs psychology. Accounts of many similar 
experiments have been published, all involving the assignment (or not) of gendered 
characteristics to non-sexed objects (e.g. Vigliocco et al., 2005; Cubelli et al., 2011; 
Boutonnet et al., 2012). For example, Imai et al. (2014) examine German and suggest that 
biological sex-related properties are projected onto the articles which mark gender, and that it 
is via this projection that the classificatory similarities between items which share the same 
grammatical gender arise: grammatical gender does not affect the conceptual representations 
or inferences about the associated concepts. Bassetti (2014) suggests that grammatical gender 
effects on the non-sexed objects are mitigated when a speaker knows two languages with 
different gender assignments, which Ômay increase awareness of the arbitrariness of 
language, thus reducing language-induced biases in mental representations of the worldÕ. 
This incidentally again suggests that any causal effect of grammatical gender on cognition 
can be relatively easily interfered with, and so does not run deep. The easy manipulation of 
Whorfian effects is an important lesson from the experimental work which significantly 
problematizes the view expressed in Whorfian economics that language deeply embeds 
cultural values. 
Economists have used Boroditsky et al. (2003) as evidence for Whorfianism; thus 
Santacreu-Vasut et al. (2014, p. 1) write that Ôgrammar, according to cognitive science 
research (Boroditsky et al., 2003), impacts a speakerÕs cognitive framework and mental 
representation of social realityÕ. But Boroditsky et al. (2003, p. 76) actually conclude that it is 
premature to Ôconclude that grammatical gender definitely does affect peopleÕs nonlinguistic 
representationsÕ. Further, Boroditsky et al.Õs article relates not to how grammatical gender 
affects social reality, but to whether grammatical gender affects the categorization and 
assigned properties of non-gendered objects. Thus there is no support from the cited 
psycholinguistic work for the economistsÕ claims that grammatical gender has a causal 
relation with social thinking about men and women, claims which I now examine. 
I begin with Mavisakalyan (2011), for whom Ôgender systems in language promote 
gender inequalitiesÕ. This is demonstrated by choosing a set of languages which are identified 
as those spoken at home in a set of countries, and for each country identifying a majority 
language. The countries are assigned gender-based values. The languages are classified as 
Ôstrongly genderedÕ (gender marked in first and second persons), Ômildly genderedÕ (gender 
marked only in third person) and Ôgender-neutralÕ (no gender marked in pronouns). 
Mavisakalyan says that the relative percentages of women in the labour force correlates with 
whether the majority language of the country is strongly gendered (there are 4.4 percentage 
point less women in the labour force than in gender-neutral languages), mildly gendered 
(there are 2.3 percentage point less women in the labour force than in gender neutral neutral 
languages), or gender neutral. I illustrate how this maps on to countries shortly. 
Gay et al. (2013) differentiate five levels of gender intensity (GII = gender intensity 
index, from 0 to 4) which a language may fall into, with the highest gender-intensity 
language having a combination of the properties of (i) a sex-based gender system, (ii) with 
exactly two genders, (iii) in which only male entities are assigned male gender, and (iv) there 
is a gender distinction in first and/or second person pronouns. A language with all four 
properties is called a GII4 language. Lower gender intensities from GII3 to GII0 correlate 
with fewer of these gender properties. Spanish, Hebrew and Arabic are all classified as GII4. 
Gay et al. (2013, p. 41) write that  
at both the country and the individual level, women who speak in a language Ð or 
who live in countries with a dominant language Ð that marks gender more 
intensively are less likely to participate in economic and political life and more 
likely to face formal and informal barriers when seeking to access credit and land.  
Santacreu-Vasut et al. (2013, 2014) repeat essentially the same argument as Gay et 
al., concluding that Ôthe average percentage of female presence on boards and committees is 
higher in countries with low gender marking than in those with high markingÕ (Santacreu-
Vasut et al., 2014, p. 5). 
Prewitt-Freilino et al. (2012) develop a similar argument (but in a different discipline, 
apparently not aware of the economistsÕ arguments). They divide languages into three groups, 
of ÔgenderedÕ, ÔgenderlessÕ and ÔnaturalÕ. Gendered languages have masculine and feminine 
gender assigned to nouns (sometimes other genders). Genderless languages have no 
grammatical gender in nouns or pronouns. Natural gender languages have grammatical 
gender only in pronouns. They find that Ôcountries that speak gendered languages evidence 
less gender equality than countries that speak natural gender or genderless languagesÕ, and 
Ôcountries that speak natural gender languages may be even more apt to exhibit gender 
equality Ð especially in the form of womenÕs greater access to political empowerment Ð than 
in countries where gendered or genderless languages are spokenÕ. 
These three research projects each find that a classification of languages (in terms of 
gender on pronouns) correlates with a classification of cultures (in terms of the position of 
women). In Table 1.2, I summarize the results for a selection of the languages they discuss, to 
illustrate how the same languages are differently ranked by different approaches. I have taken 
a subset of the discussed language which allows for comparison, and I have crudely aligned 
them as Ôworst for womenÕ, Ôbest for womenÕ and ÔmiddlingÕ (these terms are not used by the 
original articles). 
Languages are sorted into kinds differently by the approaches of the different articles, 
as Table 1.2 shows. So, for example, while Spanish, Hebrew and Arabic are placed by all 
three articles in the most gendered category, English is sometimes least gendered and 
sometimes in the middle, while Hindi is most gendered for Prewitt-Freilino et al. (2012), has 
a gender intensity of 3 (out of a maximal 4) for Gay et al. (2013) but is least gendered for 
Mavisakalyan (2011); German and French similarly are sometimes grouped together and 
sometimes separated in how gendered they are, depending on criteria. It is not necessarily a 
problem that there is no consistent way of classifying how gendered a language is, since it is 
possible (in this type of argument) that different types of disadvantage for women correlate 
with different ways in which a language might be gendered, but it makes the arguments less 
grounded in objective linguistic reality. Recall also that there is no good evidence from 
psychology for any causal effects. 
Before leaving this example, I want to note briefly the extent to which the typology 
ignores major differences between languages. Consider one component of GayÕs gender 
intensity, which is whether first and second pronouns are gender marked; Hebrew and 
Spanish are said to have the same value, but this is so simplified as to be probably wrong. 
Hebrew gender marks all the first and second person pronouns. But European Spanish marks 
for gender only first and second person plural. The first person plural form which is used for 
a group of women is nosotras (sometimes informally used when the majority in a meeting are 
women), while nosotros is meant to be used when all are men or in a mixed group. Second 
person plural, specifically in the ÔfamiliarÕ form, when all are women is vosotras and vosotros 
when all are men; the Ônon-familiarÕ form has ustedes for both genders. In South American 
Spanish, the gender distinction disappears in second person plural because ustedes is the only 
form used (for both familiar and non-familiar). Finally, nosotros and nosotras and vosotros 
and vosotras can probably be treated as compounds, sharing the same ungendered pronouns 
nos ÔweÕ and vos ÔyouÕ combined with a gender-sensitive suffix otros and otras (Harley and 
Ritter, 2002). So gender may not be really marked at all on the pronouns in Spanish. In all 
these ways, gender is marked in a very different way from Hebrew (and less intensively), but 
this is lost entirely in the typological simplification; furthermore South American Spanish is 
less gendered than European Spanish. 
1.5.2 Person and subject pronouns 
Kashima and Kashima (1998, 2005) correlate aspects of the Ômajor language used in a 
countryÕ with cultural dimensions associated with that country such as individualism and 
uncertainty avoidance. For example, they say that a language allows Ôpronoun dropÕ if first 
and second person pronouns can be omitted in conversations, and say that Spanish, Italian 
and Greek allow pronoun drop, while English, French and German do not. Countries are 
divided into those whose major languages allow pronoun drop and those which do not, and 
individualism scores are assigned to those countries. They find that Ôlanguages licensing 
pronoun drop are associated with lower levels of individualism than those that require the 
obligatory use of personal pronouns such as I or you as a subject of a sentenceÕ (1998, p. 
477). What reason is there to think that this correlation might arise from causation? Kashima 
and Kashima claim that the possibility of omission enables a speaker Ôto manipulate the 
presence of the self and other in discourseÕ because omission of the first or second person 
subject reduces attention to the distinction between the self and the other, thus favouring a 
contextualized approach to the self and other rather than an individualistic one. This claim 
lacks psycholinguistic support. 
Licht et al. (2007, p. 673) refer to the research reported in Kashima and Kashima 
(1998) and interpret it as follows: Ôthe license to drop pronouns, particularly to omit I, 
reduces the conceptual differentiation between person and context. It should therefore occur 
more frequently in societies whose cultures emphasize the contextualization of persons more 
and their uniqueness lessÕ. Kashima and KashimaÕs argument is also used by Tabellini (2008) 
to argue that specific cultural values (e.g. that the individual is entitled to certain basic rights) 
will causally influence good government. He wants to show that certain values are embedded 
in a culture over a long time, and because language tends to change slowly, and is associated 
with a culture, he looks to language to provide long-lasting correlates of cultural values. He 
describes language as Ôan instrument É correlated with the random evolution of ideas in the 
distant pastÕ and that the grammatical rules are Ôcorrelated with distant cultural traditionsÕ, 
thus explicitly taking on a Whorfian position. Tabellini (2008, p. 274) claims correlations are 
based on two values, as follows. First, languages in which the first person must be expressed 
by a pronoun positively correlate with indicators of generalized morality, ÔtrustÕ and ÔrespectÕ 
(leading to good government). The second value relates to T-V languages. These are 
languages which have differentiated second person pronouns; e.g. French has ÔtuÕ and ÔvousÕ, 
differentiated both for singular vs plural but also differentiated for social relations. These T-V 
languages are claimed by Tabellini to correlate negatively with ÔtrustÕ and ÔrespectÕ. Thus for 
example, English has the two linguistic values which would make it a language correlating 
with trust and respect; Italian has neither. He concludes (2008, p. 278) that Ôlanguages 
forbidding pronoun drop or that do not differentiate between T-V are associated with better 
government (the correlation here is mainly with the pronoun drop rule)Õ. 
A linguist might make several objections to Kashima and KashimaÕs use of linguistic 
evidence, and here I list four. A first objection (which can be made for all the Whorfian 
economics articles) relates to whether the complexity of the data has been properly 
acknowledged. English Ð classified as a no-pronoun-drop language associated with 
individualism Ð actually does allow pronoun drop in various personal and public styles or 
registers, including newspaper headlines and diary writing (Haegeman and Ihsane, 2001). 
This problematizes the data underlying the study but also raises a question: if there is a causal 
relation between dropping the subject and non-individualism, does this mean that diaries 
express individualism less than other English genres? A second objection relates to how first 
and second person are expressed linguistically in English (no pronoun drop) vs Italian 
(pronoun drop). Both languages express first and second person; English does so only on the 
subject pronoun, while Italian does so on the verbal morphology and optionally also on the 
subject pronoun. It is not at all clear why one type of expression (on the verbal morphology 
as in Italian) should have a weaker causal effect than another (on a pronoun). In many 
Whorfian arguments, expression of a meaning as part of the verbal morphology is considered 
to have a greater causal effect than periphrastic expression, the opposite of what we have 
here. A third objection relates to how freely omittable a pronoun is; whether the subject 
person is expressed by a pronoun or not is often determined by syntactic or other contextual 
factors (this is true in MaÕdi for example) such as discourse conditions or the need to focus 
the pronoun. These linguistic contextual factors can determine the choice of pronouns, so that 
choice is not free; this can over-ride the functional effects claimed by Kashima and Kashima. 
A fourth objection comes from the very extensive theoretical linguistic work on the 
distinctions between what linguists call Ôpro-dropÕ languages (those in which the subject 
pronoun can be omitted) and non-pro-drop languages. Pro-drop languages are diverse in kind 
(as Kashima and Kashima acknowledge); for example, in some such as Italian the verbal 
morphology provides information about the missing subject, while in others such as Chinese 
there is no relevant verbal morphology. Linguistic theorists seek to discover what underlying 
properties these languages have, which group them in certain ways: for example, most forms 
of English have no pro-drop and have a very small amount of partial verbal agreement with 
the subject, while Italian has pro-drop and uniformly full verbal agreement with the subject 
and Chinese has pro-drop and uniformly absent verbal agreement. Huang (1989) has argued 
that a pro-drop language must have uniform properties for agreement, either all present or all 
absent, hence grouping Italian and Chinese against English. In English the subject can be 
omitted only in a subordinate clause which has uniformly absent verbal morphology as in I 
want [__ to leave] where the subordinate verb ÔleaveÕ has a missing first person subject as 
marked by the line. Huang notes that the possibility of omitting the subject in a subordinate 
clause in English (uniformly without agreement) is analogous to omitting the subject in a 
main clause in Chinese (uniformly without agreement). Linguists also note that pro-drop is 
correlated with other properties in a language. Thus Romance languages like Italian which 
can omit the subject can also invert the subject as in the grammatical sentence Ha mangiato 
Giovanni (ÔGiovanni ateÕ); linguists seek a consistent explanation for this and for the 
possibility of a missing subject. In summary, linguists treat the possibility of having a 
missing subject as one piece in a complex puzzle, which is solved differently for the diverse 
ways in which it manifests in different languages, and which also is based on underlying 
similarities between languages. The simple typologies based on surface properties, which are 
the basis for Kashima and KashimaÕs paper, may not represent what people actually know 
when they know a language. 
1.5.3 Tense 
Chen (2013) proposes that Ôlanguages with obligatory future-time reference lead their 
speakers to engage in less future-oriented behaviourÕ, and that this is manifested in 
behaviours relating to savings and health. Chen divides languages into strong FTR (Ôfuture 
time referenceÕ) languages which are associated with this Ôless future-oriented behaviourÕ and 
weak FTR languages. A strong FTR language such as English requires Ôfuture events to be 
grammatically marked when making predictionsÕ, so that in English we must say It will rain 
tomorrow, grammatically marking the future with will, and we cannot say It rains tomorrow. 
A weak FTR language such as German allows Morgen regnet es, literally Ôtomorrow rains itÕ, 
with no grammatical marking of the future. Strong FTR languages (the ones which are 
ÔworseÕ in how they affect economic planning) include Hebrew, French, Russian, Spanish, 
Korean, (European) Portuguese and English. Weak FTR languages (the ones which are 
ÔbetterÕ in how they affect economic planning) are listed as: Norwegian, Danish, Swedish, 
Dutch, German, Finnish, Estonian, Chinese (Mandarin), Japanese and Brazilian Portuguese. 
Chen is explicit about causation, which is good since it makes the mechanisms by 
which language affects thinking more open to analysis, but also reveals problems in the 
words which he chooses to describe the psychological processes. Thus Chen (2013, p. 695) 
says that Ôlanguage may affect future choices by changing how different future events feelÕ, 
and in the next sentence says that using this language might Ôlead weak-FTR speakers to 
perceive future events as less distantÕ. Though feeling and perception are different kinds of 
cognition, Chen has shifted from one to another. At various points in his article, Chen 
variously describes the kinds of cognition caused by linguistic forms as ÔfeelingÕ or having 
specific ÔfeelsÕ (e.g. of vividness), ÔperceptionÕ and ÔdistinguishingÕ (possibly related to 
perception), Ôwillingness (to behave)Õ, ÔbeliefÕ, ÔrememberingÕ and Ômaking (some outcome) 
more attractiveÕ. This terminological variety leaves psychological aspects of causation 
undefined. 
The linguist sten DahlÕs theoretical and descriptive work on tense is a key source for 
Chen, and Dahl has responded negatively to a pre-publication version of ChenÕs article in a 
blog post (http://dlc.hypotheses.org/360). I now summarize two of DahlÕs objections. 
<list> 
(i) Chen uses a single criterion for deciding whether a grammar must distinguish Ôprediction-
based future time referenceÕ. By this criterion, Finnish and Estonian have hardly any 
future marking connected to the verb and so for Chen are weak FTR languages, while 
Russian is treated as a strong FTR language. However, once a wider range of relevant 
grammatical facts are examined, the distinction into two types of language is not clear. 
Thus Finnish and Estonian mark the object of the verb differently in a sentence referring to 
the future (and thus might have been re-analysed as strong FTR). In Russian, perfective 
verbs have no special future form; rather, the present is normally interpreted as referring to 
the future, and this difference from other ways in which Ôstrong FTRÕ emerges in a 
language makes it less clear that Russian can be classified as Ôstrong FTRÕ. Many of the 
Whorfian economics articles identify some criterion for classifying languages into two 
kinds, here strong and weak FTR, but the complex ways in which languages differ work 
against such dichotomies, as they do here, where Dahl argues that there is a continuum, 
even when it comes to the specific matter of how weather predictions are expressed. 
(ii) Chen distinguishes two types of language based on a single way of talking about the 
future, exemplified by whether the future must be used in weather forecasts. Dahl looks 
at a wider range of data which complicates this significantly (showing for example that 
future time reference is not fully grammaticalized in the Romance languages called 
strong FTR by Chen) and suggests that Ôarguably, it should be the total set of patterns a 
language provides for speaking of the future that influences how we think of it rather 
than just the use of future tenses in prediction-based contextsÕ. 
</list> 
1.5.4 Whorfian linguistic economics 
All the ÔWhorfian economicsÕ articles discussed here identify languages as having specific 
values for specific linguistic features, usually drawn from typological databases such as 
WALS. I now note some problems with using WALS in this way, drawing on criticisms by 
Dahl, and by Roberts and Winters (2012, 2013). 
<list> 
(i) Dahl (2013) says: Ôwhen preparing the WALS map ÒThe Future TenseÓ we decided to 
refrain from classifying futures in any other way than by whether they were expressed 
morphologically or not, since we found that the information in grammars was usually not 
sufficient for anything elseÕ. Simplified data may be misused for correlations, concealing 
the true complexity of actual language data. In his co-authored article in WALS, he has 
this to say:  
Tense and aspect are notoriously difficult categories to describe adequately, 
and the treatment in grammars is often problematic, especially if one wants 
to use it for cross-linguistic comparison. As far as possible, we have tried to 
apply consistent criteria in classifying tense-aspect phenomena. For this 
reason, our interpretations sometimes differ from those found in grammars. 
The reader should thus not be surprised if a language is classified in an 
unexpected way. (Dahl and Velupillai, 2013) 
(ii) Roberts and Winters (2012, 2013) offer a general discussion of the problems 
associated with using WALS or other large databases of linguistic features as the primary 
or sole source of evidence for formulating large-scale correlations of the kind seen in the 
economics articles. Their article more generally discusses, critically, the use of what they 
call nomothetic studies (statistical analyses of large-scale cross-cultural data). One of 
their concerns is that these databases are only as reliable as the sources Ð grammars and 
other descriptions Ð on which they are based, but these sources vary greatly in their 
reliability. This is because for some languages there is just one account by one analyst, 
and the reliability of the data depends on the analystÕs skill, classificatory decisions and 
theoretical assumptions. 
(iii) Dahl as well as Roberts and Winters note that cultural phenomena may be bundled 
with each other without any causal relation between them. Dahl notes for example that 
Ôall the nine full member countries of the International Cricket Council also have left-
hand drivingÕ, but there is no causal relation between these; instead, the countries have 
co-developed for historical reasons, resulting in their sharing certain features. Two 
historically related languages may similarly share some language-internal correlation 
between linguistic features, but for reasons of historical development rather than for any 
underlying principle. Some of the correlations between linguistic features and non-
linguistic features similarly are ÔbundlesÕ which have co-developed historically but with 
no causal relation between them, and no general principle underlying the correlation. 
</list> 
In this section I have described various economics and psychology articles which 
propose that some aspect of linguistic form in a language can cause its speakers to think and 
behave in ways which are realized in the culture. There are two general reasons for being 
cautious about the conclusions drawn in these articles. First, there are concerns which 
theoretical and descriptive linguists might raise regarding the representations in these articles 
of the linguistic data, that its simplifications are no longer recognizable representations of the 
linguistic facts, and do not recognize the potential abstractness of the data. At a minimum, 
economists who wish to pursue causal arguments involving linguistic data might want to 
discuss more extensively with theoretical linguists. 
The second major problem relates to causation. Causation of this kind is necessarily 
difficult to demonstrate; there is no general background agreement amongst psycholinguists 
that specific Whorfian effects exist, and what evidence has been cited usually shows that 
Whorfian effects are very shallow and can be easily reversed experimentally. Whorfian 
economics thus needs to demonstrate a more rigorous theory of causation which is 
compatible with experimental work on language and thought (including the full range of 
evidence and counter-evidence), and which would support the correlations claimed. 
1.6 Non-Whorfian proposals that language 
influences thought 
Whorfian approaches to the causal influence of language on thought (or vice versa) are 
focused on the differences between languages and how those differences might cause 
differences in the way speakers of those languages think and behave. In this section I look at 
how a choice between options within a single language may have effects on how the speakers 
think. This is non-Whorfian because it does not involve claims that different languages have 
language-specific causal effects on thought or behaviour. 
The British sociologist Basil Bernstein (1971) influentially argued that English is 
differentially accessed or used by different social classes, claiming that upper-middle-class 
children speak in an elaborated code (which he saw as a fuller use of the possibilities of the 
language) while working-class children speak in a restricted code (which he saw as an 
impoverished use of the possibilities of the language). BernsteinÕs work has been 
controversial (particularly amongst sociolinguists) but it has had significant influence in 
education, given the importance in educational theory of overcoming class-correlated 
disadvantage. 
Stylistic choices might influence thought and behaviour. For example, a language 
may offer alternative ways of phrasing the same proposition (or asking the same question). A 
well known account of this is Tversky and KahnemanÕs (1981) study of how two different 
ways of phrasing the same options in a question can lead to significantly different responses: 
they show that Ôseemingly inconsequential changes in the formulation of choice problems 
caused significant shifts of preferenceÕ (1981, p. 457). The claim that stylistic choices can 
influence thought and behaviour is also important in critical discourse analysis, widely used 
in the social sciences while having little to do with the Whorfian question of whether the 
distinct forms of a language have the potential to influence thought. Critical discourse 
analysis is best understood as a methodology in social science; it has little relation to 
linguistic theory. 
Psychological experiments have demonstrated that how a text is written can affect 
aspects of the psychology of the reader or hearer. These are on-line effects driven by stylistic 
choices within a single language, not Whorfian effects by which the language as a whole 
system shapes a cultureÕs thinking. For example, Hasher et al. (1977, p. 111) showed that 
repetition of a statement Ôincreases a personÕs belief in the referential validity or truth of that 
statementÕ. This is a well-established finding which McGlone and Tofighbakhsh (2000) 
adapted to demonstrate experimentally that aphorisms which rhyme are judged to be truer 
than aphorisms which do not. In both cases, repetition (including rhyme as a type of 
repetition) increases the fluency of processing, and that fluent processing leads the hearer to 
attribute greater truth and even familiarity to the content of what is being processed (and they 
like it more). Psycholinguistic experiments have similarly shown weak effects on thought, 
judgement and behaviour which are determined by stylistic choices in a stimulus text. Here, 
we are in the domain of neuroeconomics, and it may be that relevant experiments might show 
stylistic effects on economically relevant decision making. 
1.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated some of the ways in which languages have diverse forms and has 
illustrated how linguistic diversity is explained by one of the dominant types of theoretical 
linguistics, generative linguistics. This discussion was the context for the part of the chapter 
in which I looked at a number of articles by economists and others, where the diverse forms 
of languages are said to have a causal connection with the diverse forms, particularly the 
values, of cultures. I have argued that it is premature to come to these conclusions. Languages 
vary in much more complex and detailed ways than is accommodated by the binary divisions 
favoured in the Whorfian articles. The Whorfian claim that language causes thought is not 
well established: it is still widely contested. And, finally, linguistic theory offers a vision of 
linguistic form which makes Whorfian causation less plausible in general, given the linguistic 
theoretical commitment to abstract form and how this explains linguistic variation. Any 
future work in Whorfian economics will need to take these considerations more fully into 
account. 
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Table 1.1 Profane and Profanity 
Underlying 
representations 
profǣn profǣn + õty Underlying vowel is long 
ǣ (same for unsuffixed and 
suffixed form) 
Stress assignment profǣn profǣn + õty Stress is assigned 
(indicated by underlining) 
Shortening rule profǣn prof¾n + õty Antepenultimate vowel is 
shortened: affects 
ÔprofanityÕ only 
Dipthongization rule profǣyn prof¾n + õty Long vowels are 
diphthongized: affects 
ÔprofaneÕ only 
Vowel shift rule profēyn prof¾n + õty Stressed long vowels are 
altered in quality, e.g. [¾] 
moves up to become [e]: 
affects ÔprofaneÕ only 
Surface representations profēyn prof¾nõty Different surface vowels 
 
Table 1.2 Gender and Language 
Mavisakalyan (2011) 
Worst for women Strongly gendered Arabic, Hebrew, Spanish 
Middling Mildly gendered Chinese (Mandarin), Dutch, English, 
French, German, Greek, Italian, 
Lithuanian, Norwegian, Polish, 
Portuguese, Russian, Romanian, 
Swedish 
Best for women Gender-neutral Azerbaijani, Chichewa, Estonian, 
Finnish, Hindi, Hungarian, Khmer, 
Malay, Mongolian (Khalkha), Thai, 
Turkish, Vietnamese 
 
Gay et al. (2013) 
Worst for women GII4 Arabic, Hebrew, Spanish 
 GII3 French, Hindi 
Middling GII2 German, Greek, Icelandic, Italian, 
Lithuanian, Portuguese Russian 
 GII1 Chichewa, Dutch, English, Norwegian, 
Polish, Romanian, Swedish 
Best for women GII0 Azerbaijani, Khmer, Chinese 
(Mandarin), Estonian, Finnish, 
Hungarian, Indonesian, Korean, Malay, 
Mongolian (Khalkha), Thai, Turkish, 
Vietnamese 
 
Prewitt-Freilino et al. (2012) 
Worst for women Gendered Arabic, Dutch, French, German, Greek, 
Hebrew, Hindi, Irish, Italian, Korean, 
Portuguese, Polish, Romanian, 
Russian, Spanish, Tamil 
Middling Genderless Azerbaijani, Chichewa, Chinese 
(Mandarin), Khmer, Estonian, Finnish, 
Hungarian, Indonesian, Malay, 
Lithuanian, Mongolian (Khalkha), Thai 
Turkish, Vietnamese  
Best for women Natural English, Icelandic, Norwegian, 
Swedish 
 
Figure 1.1 His mother loves John (ÔhisÕ can be interpreted as ÔJohnÕ) 
Figure 1.2 He loves John (ÔheÕ cannot be interpreted as ÔJohnÕ) 
Figure 1.3 That he is hot Bothers John (ÔheÕ can be interpreted as ÔJohnÕ) 
Figure 1.4 C-Command 
Figure 1.5!Government and binding theory!
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